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The Politics of Imagination 
Arthur C. Dan to 
In the days before Glasnost cast its first pale and tentative light over 
what conservatives refer to as The Empire of Evil, authors from the 
West who went there as cultural emissaries found it bracing-"inspirit-
ing" was the term used by Hortense Calisher-to be in a world where 
writing was considered dangerous. The sense of having one's words 
suddenly mean something might-almost-have been a fair exchange 
for the freedom one might have to surrender, if the latter were purchased 
at the cost of no one especially caring how it was exercised in art: as it 
might suddenly enter a feminist's mind that it was deeply moving to be 
in a culture where it meant something 'to be a woman,' even if at the 
cost of a freedom and independence she had fought to achieve. I dare say 
very few would strike the bargain, freedom perhaps trumping signifi-
cance in one's schedule of values, an ordering to be reckoned with when 
we sentimentalize organic communities by contrast with individualistic 
liberal societies where the intervention into single lives by the aggregate 
social order is marginal and limited. And in any case the intoxication of 
being thought of as dangerous is somewhat diminished by the reflection 
that it is not art alone, but personal correspondence and even mere 
conversation, that will be considered dangerous enough to justify 
monitoring by the state, functioning as a literal, suspicious, humorless, 
and largely arbitrary referee. 
When the censor functions as a third party at every interchange of 
discourse, at whatever level of communication, the remaining two 
parties will inevitably resort to intricate and oblique strategies of 
concealment and disguise, where lines arc written primarily that the text 
should be located and looked for between them, and the uninscribed text 
be finally that for the sake of which the written one exists-as if heard 
melodies exhausted their role in making unheard melodies audible to a 
third, secret ear. I have been with Poles whose every utterance is filtered 
through so many strata of irony that no one who has not internalized the 
complex sequence of bureaucracies under which they mastered aesopean 
concealment can hope to understand them fully or participate in 
anything save a coarse level of communication. I am, in such colloquys, 
reminded of Proust's description of the Narrator's great aunts, in the 
Combray section of Remembrance of Things Past, as "women who had 
brought to such a fine art the concealment of a personal allusion in a 
wealth of ingenious circumlocution, that it would often pass unnoticed 
even by the person to whom it was addressed." Once a labyrinth of 
tertiary significations mediates between author and reader, writing as 
such, even when frivolous, is not to be taken at face value, and 
everything is dangerous even, or especially, when it seems most 
ingenuous. Paranoia becomes a rational posture when "Jack and Jill 
went up the hill" is under cryptographic surveillance and the censor is 
desperate not to let anything get through. Its being hidden is what 
makes it dangerous, even if it would not be recognized as especially 
dangerous if openly said. 
In January, 1986, the PEN organization hosted in New York an 
international conference of writers to ponder over some days the topic 
"The Imagination of the Writer and the Imagination of the State." It 
was an uninspired title, or at least did little to enlist the imagination of 
the writers invited to address one another beyond the obvious sort of 
remark, predictably made the first morning: ''The State has no 
Imagination" (ha ha), a piety that wore rapidly thinner as it was 
repeated from session to session. But it seems to me an argument can be 
made that the imagination of a writer is very much a product of what the 
imagination of bureaucrats concerned with writers imagines writing to 
be, since the writer's consciousness has internalized the schedule of 
permissibilities and prohibitions that defines the political morality of 
expression. The imagination of the state may then just be the imagina-
tion of the writer writ large. That the system of political legitimacy and 
the structures of artistic expression should be reciprocals of one another 
is after all a deep thesis of Historical Materialism-the view that art and 
politics are surface manifestations of the same deep structure that defines 
a social order. But I am proposing a less ponderous thesis in the social 
psychology of art, that our art and our political reality are made for one 
another, that each, one might say, is the same set of symbolic forms 
differently embodied-in the media of artistic administration and 
artistic expression respectively. If one were to construct an architectural 
model of artistic consciousness under a system of censorship, it would 
look like one of Piranesi's prisons: stairways leading nowhere, doors 
opening onto blank walls, dead-ends masked as infinite vistas, 
causeways ending in abrupt emptiness, unsuspected shafts, circuitous 
corridors leading insidiously back to the point at which one enters them, 
where the inhabitants bump into themselves rounding corners and the 
victim recognizes in the blackness of the torture-chamber that the 
executioner is himself. If, as has been insisted since Plato, the soul is an 
isomorph of the state, then the objectification of the soul in literature is 
the best picture of the state we can have, providing we can learn to read 
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it. But naturally, if this is true, wntmg can be translated from one 
political culture to another only at the most superficial level. How are we 
to replace the texts that haunt the interlinear cmptincsses, the eloquent 
blankness of margins, if even the usc of a semi-colon may carry the 
semiological density of poetry? 
And when Glasnost comes, it is, accordingly, a mixed blessing to the 
artist who had counted on the hermeneutic mentality that guaranteed 
subtleties and depths that simply wash away when there is no presump-
tion ofhiddenness. "For Soviet Rock Musicians. Glasnost is Angst" was 
the headline of a New York Times article not long ago. Rock music was 
itself defined as hidden, its form refJecting the standing attitude toward 
artistic content in general, and hence necessarily an underground 
activity: it was, the reporter says, "a subterranean world of illicit clubs 
and black market tapes, subject to police raids and regular condemna-
tions in the official press." To legitimize rock is therefore to rob it of its 
form and hence of its meaning: an officially condoned rock is precisely 
rock that the state has conquered, so that poor Boris Grcbenshchikov is 
damned by his acceptance to fear that he will lose his edge by virtue of 
official acceptance, as did his friend Andrei Makharcivich, the leader of 
a group called Time Machine. "Nobody can believe that the system has 
changed," Boris complained. "They think we must have changed." So 
the only way to remain artistically honest is to continue to conceal, or at 
least for one's audience to continue to believe bland lyrics cover dark 
messages intended specifically for them, much as the youth of twenty 
years ago believed Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Band transmitted a 
code underneath the resented approbation of parents, and that the 
Beatles remained subversive after all. So the indelible structures of what 
I have elsewhere called deep interpretation-interpretation which asks 
what is really being said in what in fact is said-is carried fonvard, and 
remains as a precondition of artistic significance, into the era of Glasnost. 
Deep readers will have noticed, a paragraph back, a distorted echo of 
a famous phrase ofWittgenstein's: The human body is the best picture 
we have of the human soul. His point, infinitely contestible as every-
thing he wrote is, is that we can have no picture of the human mind save 
as embodied, and so in speaking of it we are ultimately speaking of the 
bodily gestures and expressions which give mental states their form and 
mental language its criteria. And I want to say something parallel, that 
the artwork of a state embodies the state, or that the state is embodied in 
the set of artworks it enfranchises, so that writing is never not the 
inscription of the political order in which it is done, and that all art is 
political in consequence, even if politics should not be its immediate 
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content. Po1itical art, that is, is a species of art that is po1itical in the way 
I am suggesting, so that even the least political of writing celebrates, in 
the structure through which its readers address it, the order of politics in 
which those readers themselves have their form, and their literary 
imagination embodies the same politics as the works to which they 
respond. And of course that raises the problems alluded to in the remark 
about translation: for works that embody distinct political orders are in 
some deep way as incommensurable as those political orders themselves 
are. 
This is so even when art is most free, as in our own political order, 
though one of the points I want to make is that the only freedom we are 
likely to accord is the maximal degree of freedom. Consider the defenses 
advanced on behalf of Ulysses a generation ago, or of Lac(y Chatterley's 
Lover. The argument was not that the words and phrases that occurred in 
these works and which raised the question of censorship did not, in 
themselves and as such, merit censorship: they really were scatological 
or offensive-the authors would not have used them if they were not. 
But since they occurred integrally in what experts agreed were works of 
art-works in fact of high literary art-they could be allowed-as if, 
understood as forming parts of artistic wholes, the words or phrases 
could not affect the reader who was, by this fact alone, immunized 
against what would have been their toxin if written or uttered in a non-
artistic context. It was as if its being art neutralized content much as 
being officially acceptable in another part of the world neutralizes art. 
And it is this that enables art to be free. It is true that there remains the 
danger that those insensitive to the concept of art might search out the 
books for the thrill of seeing dirty words in print-as we all did, when 
young and nasty, with our parent's dictionaries. But the concept of art 
interposes between life and literature a very tough membrane, which 
insures the incapacity of the artist to inflict moral harm so long as it is 
recognized that what he is doing is art. And this leads to the nightmare 
of impotency that accounts in some measure for the relief our writers felt 
in the political world where art was acknowledged as dangerous. What 
more tormenting dream could a playwright have than imagining putting 
the deepest and most unsettling challenges to the values of an audience, 
only to receive a standing ovation from those he intended to portray as 
hypocrites, villains, tartuffes, iagos, corrupters, transgressors, rogues 
and swine? It would be as though Hamlet, meaning to trap the 
conscience of the king in the mirror of art, were to please the king 
instead, who likes the way he is shown and tips a wink of complicity to 
his wayward stepson for whom there is now an inkling after all of hope. 
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But it is even worse here, for the question of like or not like does not 
arise, it being art. Nietzsche once wrote as an aphorism of desperation 
"I listened for an echo and heard only applause." So those writers 
excited by the vision of art as dangerous when abroad have failed to 
recognize how dangerous art must be perceived at home if our way of 
dealing with it is to insure, by conceptual repression, that it cannot but 
be innocuous if art. That is why the freedom in question is total. If there 
were degrees and distinctions, we would be treating it as other than art. 
You can say whatever you like since it has no real meaning, providing it 
is art. So it is not really freedom either. 
I have never fully understood the thesis that art is dangerous, and 
particularly that it is politically dangerous, but certainly it is a very 
ancient thesis, and is part of what I have elsewhere designated the 
philosophical disenfranchisement of art-for the first philosophical 
responses to art were in effect theories, the political purpose of which was 
to extrude art, somehow, from the possibility of efficacy, and lodge it, 
metaphysically or institutionally, where it could do us no harm. 
Nietzsche held a theory of the birth of tragedy that could go some 
distance in accounting for this fear and hence this need. His thought was 
that ancient tragedy evolved out of dionysian rites, which were per-
ceived as especially dangerous to the moral order because participation 
in them consisted of orgiastic frenzy, the dissolution of restraints of every 
sort, the creation of hallucination so extreme that, as represented in the 
Bacchae, a mother could participate in the dismemberment and canni-
balization of her own son. In an odd way, art was a·way of taming these 
barbaric practices, putting them at a kind of distance so that instead of 
participants there was an audience, segregated by the conventions of 
theatricality from a spectacle that reenacted, in some symbolic way, 
practices the smoking memory of which remained in the Greek uncon-
scious as a threat to order, value, stability. Perhaps, the tacit recognition 
of suppressed danger energized the spectacle, and the work of art was 
like the box of Pandora, concealing in itself the dark destructive 
energies, the threat of whose release meant chaos. But then, once the 
conventions were in place, they could be used as a kind of transparent 
shield by artists or poets who then could say or do whatever they wished 
under the protection of the institution, something like the fool of the 
medieval court, but having an effect on his viewers because he was a 
poet without, for exactly that reason, being exposed to any adverse effect 
on himself. I have in mind especially the Old Comedy (470-300 BC), the 
wounding exaggerations of which, at the hands of Aristophanes, knew 
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no limit and respected no person. Behind the shield of poetry, 
Aristophanes moralized, agitated, wounded, maligned, slandered, lied, 
lobbied, and pleaded on behalf of values that had not a chance any 
longer, in the name of an order that had long vanished, but in language 
that was magnificent and moving, and dangerous for that reason. He 
was not an intellectual, however, and as Plato undertook to show no 
artist really was, none of them knowing anything and hence none of 
them to be trusted in circumstances, like politics, where knowledge was 
essential. And bit by bit Plato, himself wounded through the treatment 
by Aristophanes of Socrates in The Clouds, dismantled the conventions of 
the theater and reconstituted them as a metaphysics of art which 
guaranteed that art could have no effect whatever, making it impossible 
for it any longer to be dangerous. And in the process of giving a 
systematic definition of art, Plato defined philosophy-which may in 
fact before then have been the somewhat untrammelled and dis-
systematic enterprise Aristophanes depicted it as in The Clouds. 
Consider, for example, just the theory that art is imitation. It has 
been insufficiently appreciated how political the theory is, for it has the 
effect, if credited, of paralyzing the artist: if audiences would appreciate 
that art is illusion, sufficiently like reality to be mistaken for it but 
logically situated outside reality so that it could have neither the causes 
nor the effects of reality itself-an idle epiphenomenon-then art is 
metaphysically ephemeralized. It can tell us nothing we do not already 
know, and the artist is reduced to a mere facsimilist with knowledge 
of nothing save how to do that. So he cannot have the authority of 
someone who works in reality-like a carpenter, or a navigator or a 
doctor-or who understands how to know reality, like the philosopher, 
rather than, as a mirror, someone who knows only how to register the 
appearances. Mimesis was, then, less a theory of art than a philosophical 
aggression against art (one which, by the way, makes Aristophanes 
impossible), vaporising art by situating it in a plane where it can do no 
harm because of how dangerous it was when in that plane and 
interacting effectively with political reality. How deeply this theory of 
ephemerality has been internalized by artists themselves is testified to by 
Auden's thought that "Poetry makes nothing happen.'' And yet, Auden 
felt in the same poem, there is compensation for ineffectuality, namely a 
kind of immortality because of Time's worship of language. Time 
worships language "and forgives everyone by whom it lives.'' And so it 
allows us to remember Aristophanes for what one authority calls "the 
true glories" of his art: his praise of country life in The Peace, the 
serenade in the Ecclesiusuzae, the maiden song from Lysistrata, the chant 
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of the Initiated in the Frogs. In brief, ephemeralization is compensated 
for by aesthcticization, and Aristophanes is redeemed for art by being 
reduced to an anthology of literary gems. 
We no longer accept the mimetic theory, which has to be in any case 
distorted if it is to capture works of art much more complex than those 
that satisfy themselves by mere resemblance-and we begin to see the 
first serious effort to transform it from an aggression to an analysis in 
The Poetics-but it does not greatly matter, politically, since in aesthet-
icization we have the supreme disenfranchisement, for the work of art is 
reduced by its means to something that exists for gratification. There 
exists a contrast, almost canonical, between the "aesthetic point of 
view" and "the practical point of view," the latter being the perspective 
under which the question of what to do arises, where the consideration 
of what difference or effect something has comes into play, and where we 
arc engaged with reality. And this contast is enshrined in one of the 
masterpieces of disenfranchising philosophy, Kant's Critique of judgement, 
where in the first instance art is something we judge and where the 
judgement is aesthetic, that is, with reference finally to taste. It is there 
that Kant defines beauty in terms of having no purpose though 
appearing to be purposive-" Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of 
an object, so far as this is perceived in it without any representation of a 
purpose." Kant's theory of art is somewhat more complex, but beauty is 
an essential part of it. In the first instance an artwork is beautiful only on 
condition that it seems like nature, and hence beautiful in the way in 
which nature is (in a sense this is a disguised form of the theory of 
mimesis, for the artist seeks to imitate nature by seeming free from all 
artifice). And in the second instance art deserves to be called beautiful 
on the basis of taste, hence aesthetic judgement. So in the end, Kant's 
theory of art is this: artworks please without subserving any interest 
(hence he opposes a theory of art as having any use). It pleases "without 
concepts" -or it awakens the sense that there is a concept without any 
specific concept being implied, so it as it were awakens thought without 
allowing thought any substance, which restates in effect his "purpos-
iveness without any specific purpose" theme; and that aesthetic judge-
ment is essentially universal-so outside of politics just because politics 
is the sphere of conflict and especially of conflicting interests. An 
imitation appears to show something with a purpose, but can have no 
purpose of its own since it fails if we don't know the original and is 
useless if we do. So let the artist be free since it does not matter what he 
docs. We have built a logical pedestal which in fact is an ingenious form 
of prison, and I have often remarked on the resemblance between the 
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use of the pedestal here and in the extrusion of women from the practical 
affairs of life: Plato too was prepared to honor the artists by exile until he 
hit upon the theories that were a better form of exile, kicking art 
upstairs. 
Aesthetics is very much an eighteenth century invention, a period 
when nature was sufficiently under human domination that one could 
address it from without, see it as an object less of threats than for 
pleasure, as in landscape gardening which, according to Kant "gives 
only the appearance of utility and availability for other purposes than 
the mere play of the imagination in the contemplation of its forms." In 
brief, nature and art seemed together the object of a single kind of 
disinterested judgement, abstracted from all questions of use and 
practice. And I think it not coincidental that the age of aesthetics, as we 
may call it, was coeval with the rise of the political values of the liberal 
state, with its great emphasis on the apparatus of natural rights and 
inalienable freedoms. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
history of English literature was pretty much the history of censorship. 
In large measure, I believe, literature seemed to open up ways of saying 
things that could not be said directly, which meant already that literature 
was a mechanism of repression, standing to the writer's true beliefs and 
attitudes in something like the relationship in which Freud supposes the 
manifest content of a dream stands to the latent pathogens of the 
repressed unconscious. What Freud explicitly calls "the censor" allows 
the latent thought to be expressed (or "discharged"), but in highly 
disguised forms, so much so that it is said to demand immense 
hermeneutical skill on the part of the therapist to find out what is really 
meant. The extraordinary political contribution of the aesthetic attitude 
in the eighteenth century was to render obsolete the mechanisms of 
indirection between writer and reader. Remember, we are discussing 
literature, not prose as such. There was no press censorship in England 
after 1695, Milton's Areopagitica had its effect only after the Revolution, 
and so it was possible to tell the news (except in wartime) and express 
editorial opinion freely, and so there was no need to have recourse to 
literary concealment. In literature, too, there was freedom to say 
anything, as directly as one wished (of course there was drama 
censorship in England until very nearly the present, and film censorship 
in America), without suffering any of the consequences to which one 
would be liable were one to have said the same thing without the 
bilateral immunities the concept of art introduces, which in effect 
protects everybody in a way that would be impossible if the same 
message were transmitted outside the category of the artwork. 
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Treating a text as an aesthetic object, viewing it through the 
protective lenses of the new concept of an, audiences were able to 
contemplate across an irreducible distance-"aesthetic distance" as it 
got to be called in a celebrated essay-the most incendiary gestures and 
declarations without any effect at all. It allowed the artist perfect 
freedom, but at the cost of total and logically guaranteed harmlessness. 
And surely the transformations of poetic style from the seventeenth to 
the eighteenth century and beyond in English writing have to be 
explained as due to the acceptance of the new aesthetic point of view. 
The richly involuted structures of metaphysical poetry have to be 
understood as correlative with the heavy penalties attached to making a 
religious or political misstep: Donne's parents were Catholics, in a time 
when being a Catholic in England was fraught with danger. His mother 
was descended from Thomas More, who met a martyr's death; his 
father wrote epigrams. It is as though the densely mazed architectures of 
such writing, in which reading was an exercise in decoding, were a 
perfect adaptation under the most severe constraints of artistic, let alone 
personal, survival. 
I would like at this point to insert a kind of digression. Modern 
criticism, I think it will be conceded, begins with Eliot, whose para-
digms were such writers as Donne and Crashaw, for whom interpreta-
tion was required even in their own day as a condition for determining 
what was being said by means of what in fact was said, and hence deep 
interpretation was the standard way of reading. But criticism, then, 
began to assume the form of other systems of deep interpretation-
psychoanalysis and marxism-and under this pressure, all texts became 
concealments, and deconstruction an inevitability. This gives the critic a 
great power, virtually the power of the priest, since only he or she knows 
what truly is being transmitted, and so constitutes the true reader. The 
rest of us either have to be taught to read, or take the critic as the 
authority. This has had two immediate corollaries. In the first instance, 
it developed in response a style of writing made to order for the critic, 
who came to serve the role of the censor in political systems which drive 
the writer to acts of increasingly complex concealment, where every 
letter is in effect the purloined letter. And of course the other corollary 
was the inevitable impact on critical writing itself, which becomes 
increasingly obscure, to the point that only other critics can read it and 
their interpretations arc uncertain and obscure, and set forth in any case 
in texts that in turn require criticism-to the point where criticism 
exemplifies the literary ideal and a critic like Geoffrey Hartman can 
claim that the critic is the true artist of our time-or that literature itself 
is justified to the degree that it makes literary criticism possible. 
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When the new schedules of rights and freedoms emerged as politi-
cally urgent, forming the political foundation of the great enabling 
documents in the history of human rights, making persecution for 
beliefs and feelings a violation of human dignity, aesthetics was ready to 
hand to insure that what artists said would have no adverse political 
effect. Increasingly direct utterance, with a collateral mistrust of orna-
mentation and allusion, followed as a matter of course. By the time of 
Wordsworth, poets could even usc the vernacular speech of plain men 
and women. To be sure, it took some time before the artistic use of 
coarse speech was essayed, but such was the genius of philosophical 
aesthetics that the salty locutions of barracks and locker rooms could find 
their way innocuously onto the printed page. 
In the eighteenth century, this would not have been tried. The 
counterpart of taste as an aesthetic sense-a sense very like what in that 
period they designated as a moral sense-was taste as an artistic 
constraint. "Taste," Kant wrote, "like the judgement in general, is the 
discipline (or training) of genius; it clips its wings, it makes it cultured 
and polished; but at the same time it gives guidance as to where and how 
far it may extend itself if it is to remain purposive. And while it brings 
clearness and order into the multitude of thoughts, it makes the ideas 
susceptible of being permanently and, at the same time, universally 
assented to, and capable of being followed by others, and of an ever 
progressive culture.'' So coarse speech would have been excluded on 
grounds of taste-but once the artifice imposed by the imperatives of 
aesopism abated, and writers could use increasingly direct language and 
syntax, the concept of aesthetic distance, at first not especially required 
in the name of artistic freedom, came to serve a function much like the 
bell the leper was required to ring, opening up a sanitary path through 
society. As long as it was accepted as art, no one was in danger of 
contagion. 
The limits are naturally always being tested. Recently, a group of 
Jewish vigilantes prevented the Kammerspiel Theater in Frankfurt from 
putting on what was an evidently explicit antisemitic play by Rainer 
Werner Fassbinder. It is characteristic that people would be more 
shocked by the Jews than by Fassbinder: a high school teacher in the 
audience was reported by the Ntw lOrk Times as having said that she 
would be unable to explain all this to her students, since "I have always 
told them that art was one thing that could never be touched or 
prevented." And what I am seeking to explain is how the high school 
teacher ever could have acquired that view. The case justifies a moment 
of serious reflection. 
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Kant made a remarkable observation in connection with the concept 
of beautiful art, namely that it was able to treat as beautiful things that 
in reality are ugly or displeasing. It was as though its being art meant 
that it could not be ugly, unless it failed on grounds that have nothing to 
do with subject-matter: "The furies, diseases, the devastations of war 
even when regarded as calamitous may be described as very beautiful, as 
they are represented in a picture." Kant meant, I think, that something 
can be a beautiful representation of an ugly thing, the aesthetics of the 
subject not penetrating the representation itself. Think of how beautiful 
Rembrandt's depictions of quite ugly and unpleasing things can be. But 
Kant, with his marvelous genius for distinctions, made an exception: 
There is only one kind of ugliness which cannot be represented in accordance 
with nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, and consequently 
artificial beauty, viz., that which excites di•gwt. For in this singular sensation, 
which rests on mere imagination, the object is represented as if it were obtruding 
itself for our enjoyment, while we strive against it with all our miglll. And the 
artistic representation of the object is no longer distinguished from the nature of 
the object itself in our sensation, and thus it is impossible that it can be regarded 
as beautiful. 
It would be interesting to have an example of what Kant meant, though 
he interestingly went on to show how sculpture tended to represent 
things ugly in themselves via symbols and allegories, and hence through 
art where the senses alone would not suffice for appreciation, since they 
were symbolic and required interpretation-as if, for these, the mere 
fact of aesthetic distance would not suffice and the mechanisms of 
disguise and concealment the aesthetic attitude othenvise made obsolete 
were required. But Fassbinder appears to have been flat out antisemitic 
in this play, and it is useful to consider this against Kant's position on 
disgust. 
There was a time when under law, the quotation of obscenity was 
itself obscene, so that for a certain class of utterances, the distinction 
between use and mention was dissolved. That you cannot mention 
certain words without being perceived as using them is in some measure 
testified to by the fact that the Meese Report on pornography is one of 
the hottest publications on the market (there was a celebrated lingerie 
catalog from Bloomingdale's that fell into the same category). In an age, 
such as ours, of what is termed image appropriation, where painters as it 
were quote images without being thought any the less original as artists 
for doing so, the appropriation of pornographic images is perceived as 
pornographic in its own right. Feminists, in my view rightly, object to 
the paintings of David Salle for their constant depiction of women in 
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sexually humiliating positions, and perhaps there is an even greater 
moral stigma that attaches to the appropriation rather than the immedi-
ate use of pornography in the manner of David Salle, just because in the 
latter instance it is being used to arouse males while in the former case it 
is being used to outrage and provoke females, so that feminists rightly 
again sense a degree of overt hostility in the paintings that is a matter of 
abstract speculation in the originals: the pornographer may be engaged 
in an entirely different kind of act. 
Now in my view the Jewish protesters in Frankfurt were insisting 
that the theatrical mimesis of antisemitism is already antisemitic-that 
with this discourse, imitation and reality are one. So after two centuries 
of aestheticism, there are still expressions-racist, sexist, and doubtless 
others-that act as solvents against the prophylactic shield of art. The 
teacher was insisting that the concept of art is strong enough to 
withstand even the idiom of bigotry. The Jews were insisting, with 
Plato, that something can be art and dangerous, even when mimetic 
(and here the mimetic theory fails of its purpose), that certain words are 
hateful even in the mouths of those who do not necessarily mean them, 
or only pretend that they arc being said. It was almost certainly with this 
in mind that Plato as the architect of an ideal state prohibited young 
people from imitating certain characters. Whatever the effect on their 
character, it was true that they would be disgusting in saying or 
imitating disgusting things. The whole of Western Philosophy, to judge 
by its systematic effort to disenfranchise art from any practical role in 
life, massively confirms this intuition. The art historian, Edgard Wind, 
writes as follows in The Eloquence of Symbols: 
It is quite customary today, in cases at law, to justify a work of questionable moral 
value by extoUing its artistic merits. As if the struggle between the two forces 
could be settled by a neat differentiation in terms! As if danger to morality ceased 
where the power of artistic creation begins! As if art merely idealized its object, 
without intensifying it! Only an age in which the power of art is unrecognized, an 
age when the connection between moral and artistic forces has been lost, could 
one think and judge in that way. For such an age, Plato's demand is bound to 
read like a riddle. 
Fassbinder said, of "Trash, The City and Death," "It's only a 
theater piece," going on to insist that its "possibly reproachable" 
methods arc used, for otherwise "You get something as dead as 
everything else in the German theater landscape ... The play doesn't 
care about taking certain precautions and I think that's right. I have to 
be allowed to react to my own reality without regard to anything. If I'm 
not allowed to do that, then I'm not allowed to do anything at all.'' But 
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of course this is false. The Jews who formed a screen so that the audience 
could not see the actors in Frankfurt were not forbidding Fassbinder's 
films, just this play-"reacting to their own reality." Of course that 
reality was complicated by the fact of its being Germany, by the fact that 
the director, Gunther Ruhle had said that the Shonzeit, literally the "no 
hunting season," for Jews might perhaps be lifted. The play opened in a 
Lower East Side storefront theater on Rivington Street, where, accord-
ing to an extremely negative review by my colleague Tom Disch, the 
director did everything he could to make the performance as revolting as 
possible-including having the actor who plays "A, The Rich Jew" 
urinate into a plastic bucket that remained on the stage until the curtain 
fell. There were no vigilantes, perhaps because the reality of New York's 
Jews really can tolerate a lot. Anyway, no one much cared here. 
I think Kant's analysis goes some distance toward explaining why art 
is dangerous. It is dangerous because its methods are open to the 
representation of dangerous things but in such a way that it becomes as 
dangerous as they arc. The representation of antisemitism is as dan-
gerous as antisemitism itself, and possibly more so because the artist 
uses his freedom to address the objects of his hatred at their most 
civilized, namely as members of a theatrical audience-just as the 
appropriator of pornographic images attacks women at their most 
civilized, as members of an art world, where the conventions of its being 
art are supposed to prevent them from striking back while they arc being 
assaulted. This is the obverse of the contradiction Kant identifies in the 
depiction of the disgusting. We can see this contradiction in both the 
chief ways of responding to the danger of art. In one part of the world, 
art is dangerous because, even of the most innocent sentence, a seditious 
interpretation is possible. Ideally under such a system art should be 
eliminated in the interests of public safety, but the residual prestige of 
high culture has so far prevented such a final solution, leaving cen-
sorship as an uneasy compromise. In the other part of the world, 
writing, so long as it is perceived as art, is categorically excluded from 
the class of dangerous acts, but this because the very concept of art 
prevents the interpretation that would be natural if we were dealing with 
real discourse. The task of the writer under the first system is to 
circumvent the censor, but at the risk of losing his audience, which 
cannot find the thread. I expect it is that that makes abstract art seem so 
dangerous under the system of censorship-the censor keeps looking for 
the code. Or writing becomes, as it is under contemporary strategies of 
criticism, simply the occasion for canny interpretations, since readers 
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can attribute to it any meaning they choose, on the assumption either 
that the author is being especially subtle, or that things are revealed 
which he himself is not conscious of. Under the alternative system, the 
task of the writer is evidently constantly to test the concept, again at the 
risk of losing his audience, this time by transforming them into 
vigilantes whom he has the moral luxury of putting down as barbarians 
or philistines when they take a stand against what is after all ART. The 
two systems involve two distinct attitudes toward artists, and of artists 
toward themselves. In the one system, the artist, however conformist, is 
incipiently a rebel. In the other system, every rebel, however outra-
geous, is incipiently a conformist. In the one system, the political prison 
is a standing risk. In the other a Presidential Ceremony with a Citation 
for Excellence is the standing promise. 
It is unclear that writers or artists from either sphere arc easily 
interchanged, all the less so if the imagination of the writer and the 
"imagination" of the state are in the equilibrium of pre-established 
harmony that I proposed they are. From the one side, the freedom on 
the other must be intoxicating until it is appreciated how much it costs. 
On the other side the danger must be intoxicating until it is appreciated 
how innocuous the texts would be if there were freedom. Given the 
abysses which separate the two continents of artistic psychology, it is 
understandable that representatives from either side should communi-
cate, as at the rather awful meeting of PEN, at the level of slogans. I 
shall always bear the memory of world-famous writers behaving like 
windbags at the most portentous level of meeting hall oratory. I suppose 
we should hope for a relaxation of the aesthetic attitude so that our 
artists really are exposed to real risks, even if it is important now and 
then to stop them. And on the other side a relaxation of the forces that 
make for deviousness so that not everything one writes is a real risk 
taken. But even a minor relaxation on either side means a convergence, 
or the beginning of one, politically, psychologically, morally. Art is 
internally enough connected with the rest of life that a change in it must 
mean a change in everything else. Given the value of social stability 
there is a question of the political price of re-enfranchising art. 
My concerns, naturally, are with the philosophical re-enfranchise-
ment of art, inasmuch as the disenfranchisement itself is originally 
philosophical. Here it seems there are two tasks. The first is in a measure 
archeological. One has to return to Plato, and to identify what it was, 
however he characterized it, that he perceived as dangerous in art. And 
this of course then leads to the difficult question of the correctness of his 
analysis and the explanation, finally, of where the danger really lies, if 
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there is one. There have been some wrong theories of representation, 
fascinating but erroneous nevertheless, which have precipitated icono-
clastic movements in any number of cultures. These theories arc 
fascinating and fateful in the moral history of art, but they do not 
explain the dangerousness of art because they are false. My own sense is 
that the power of art is the power in effect of rhetoric, which I sought to 
argue in the last pages of The Transfiguration of the Commonplace-and 
rhetoric, aimed at the modification of attitude and belief, can never be 
innocent and is always real because minds are. The problem with the 
Platonic theory of art is that it recognized the power but sought to 
respond to it by offering philosophical theories of art from which it 
follows that art could not possibly be dangerous because too meta-
physically ephemeral. This is a form of denial familiar as a kind of 
psychoanalytic reflex. 
Once the power is understood, the next task is a moral one, to 
remove the merely formal freedom the concept of art has acquired, 
through which artworks can represent anything in any way without 
effect "because it is art." This is an empty freedom, and we sec it 
colliding with reality in racism and pornography. When Thomas Messer, 
Director of the Guggenheim Museum, refused exhibition of a work by 
Hans Haacke, he did so on grounds that it was not art, which he clarified 
by saying that it was not universal, by definition excluding from art the 
possibility of politics, which is essentially conflictive. This was a double 
insult to Haacke, the status of whose work as art should be acknowl-
edged. If one then wanted to exclude it on grounds of taste or moral 
revulsion-it was perceived as antisemitic by Messer and is so perceived 
today by the distinguished art historian, Leo Steinberg, who is sympa-
thetic to Haacke's work and sympathetic with Messer's position, giving 
them both a certain dignity. The art world rallied round Haacke, 
insisting that art should never be censored, the position being the mirror 
image of Messer's. My sense is that Haacke's work was dangerous only 
because it was art, and that it was intentionally aggressive, using the 
sanctity of art as a moral shield to infiltrate a politically important space. 
It was like guerrilla warfare, which uses the morality of the opponent as 
a defensive weapon. It is a cynical posture, and perfectly exemplifies 
what Kant had in mind in his analysis of the disgusting. It is an awkward 
situation for all of us, my contribution only being that we erase a 
concept of art that refuses its moral consequences, and hence the kind of 
freedom that goes with that. And then we deal with those consequences 
as we can, case by case, recognizing that these consequences follow in 
part from its being art, which raise dilemmas art-for-art's sake spared us 
during its long and sanitary reign. 
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